II-CRITICISM AND THE METHODOLOGY
For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge-proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimise, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Einstein's results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realise that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: it is not enough simply to water down the ideal of proven truth to the ideals of 'probable truth' or 'truth by consensus'.
Popper's distinction lies primarily in his having grasped the full implications of the collapse of the best-corroborated scientific theory of all times: Newtonian mechanics and the Newtonian theory of gravitation. In his view virtue lies not in caution in avoiding errors but in ruthlessness in eliminating them. Boldness in conjectures on the one hand and austerity in refutations on the other: this is Popper's recipe. Intellectual honesty then consists not in trying to entrench, or establish, one's position but in specifying precisely the conditions under which one is willing to give one's position up. Marxists and Freudians refuse to specify such conditions: this is the hallmark of their intellectual dishonesty. Belief may be a regretfully unavoidable biological weakness to be kept under the control of criticism: but commitment is for Popper an outright crime.
Kuhn thinks otherwise. He too rejects the idea that science grows by accumulation of eternal truths. He too takes his main inspiration from Einstein's overthrow of Newtonian physics.
His main problem, too, is scientific revolution. But according to Popper, science is 'revolution in permanence', and criticism the heart of the scientific enterprise; while according to Kuhn, revolution is exceptional and, indeed, extrascientific, and criticism, in 'normal times', is anathema. Indeed, for him the transition from criticism to commitment marks the point where progress -and 'normal' science-begins. For him the idea that on 'refutation' one can demand the rejection, the elimination of a theory, is 'naive' falsificationism. Criticism of the dominant theory and proposal of new theories are only allowed in the rare moments of 'crisis'. This last Kuhnian thesis has been widely criticised and I shall not discuss it. My concern is rather RESEARCH PROGRAMMES that Kuhn, having recognised the failure both of justificationism and falsificationism in providing rational accounts of scientific growth, seems now to fall back on irrationalism. While for Popper scientific change is rational or at least rationally reconstructible and thus falls in the realm of the logic of discovery, according to Kuhn scientific change-from one 'paradigm' to another-is a mystical conversion which is not and cannot be governed by rules of reason: it falls totally within the realm of the Let us see the confficting theses in some detail. I start with a discussion of three frequently conflated positions whose authors I shall call Poppero, Popper1, and Popper2. lCp. his [1969] . For an ambiguity inthis Kuhnian position cf. below, p.183, footnote 90.
la According to Popper the number, faith or vocal energy of the protagonists of a theory-whether scientific or political-are irrelevant, for they have nothing to do with the truth-content of that theory. Kuhn (like Polanyi) suggests that strength of commitment matters more than (possibly even constitutes) truth in science: and thereby lends-no doubt unintendedlyrespectability to the political credo of contemporary religious maniacs ('student revolutionaries').
'having barred conclusive disproof, has provided no substitute for it, and the relation he does employ remains that of logical falsification.'7 Therefore, Kuhn concludes, 'though he is not a naive falsificationist, Sir Karl [that is, Popper,] may....legitimately be treated as one '.8 No doubt, Kuhn has a point there. Popper1, unlike Poppero, is real. Let us scrutinise Popperl's philosophy of science.
Popperl's philosophy of science is based on bold (that is, highly falsifiable) conjectures weeded out by hard refutations. For this he needs a 'logically' distinguishable set of 'observational statements' or 'potential falsifiers', or 'basic propositions'. These are distinguished syntactically: since they must be able to negate logically and spatio-temporally universal statements, without following from them, they must be spatio-temporally singular existential statements, like 'there is a planet in the spatio-temporal region k'.9 But these propositions must also have a 'pragmatic' distinction: there has to be an experimental procedure, 'relevant technique', available and accepted at the time, with the help of which one can reach a decision about their truth-value; and finally there must be a strong logic, such that, if their truth-value is decided, this logic may establish whether they are consistent with the theory or not. In the latter case, the theory is refuted and ruthlessly rejected. But then the theory, in order to be criticisable and thus scientific, must also be neatly organised in a deductive model. The set of basic propositions, describing the possible worlds which theories forbid, constitutes their 'empirical content', which is the crucial part of the 'empirical basis'.10
The empirical basis, which provides the launching pad for refutations, consists then of statements on a lower level than the ones tested. In Popper's view this circumstance is of crucial some gravitational theory on this planetary system-a matter of considerable interest. Now let us imagine that Jodrell Bank succeeds in providing a set of space-time coordinates of the planets which is inconsistent with the theory. We shall take these statements as potential falsifiers; of course, these basic statements are not 'observational' in the usual sense-only " 'observational' $2O; they describe planets that neither the human eye nor optical instruments can reach: their truth-value is arrived at by an 'experimental technique'. But this 'experimental technique' is based on a more or less well-corroborated theory (of radio-optics) which, by the way, has nothing to do with the gravitational theory that is being tested; a theory which therefore does not appear at all in the 'deductive model' based only on the tested theory and its initial conditions. Calling these statements 'observational' is a manner of speech for saying that in the context of our problem, that is, in testing our gravitional theory, we use radio-optics uncritically, as 'background knowledge'.21 (This situation does not really differ from Galileo's 'observation' of Jupiter's planets: moreover, as his theologian contemporaries rightly pointed out, he relied on a virtually non-existent optical theory-which then was less corroborated, and even less articulated, than present-day radio-optics. And again, calling the reports of our human eye 'observational' only indicates that we 'rely' on some physiological theory of human vision.
22)
But what if our best gravitational theory is refuted by the 'experimental techniques' of Jodrell Bank? Shall we accept this as the 'overthrow' of our theory? Why not interpret the result rather as the overthrow of radio-optics?
One can easily see that when we devise an experiment in order to test, to criticise a theory, we always have to use some 'observational theories' or 'touchstone theories' (or 'interpretative theories') uncritically if we want to make its 'falsification' possible. NaYve RESEARCH PROGRAMMES falsificationism demands, therefore, that at least in a given critical situation, the body of science be divided into two, the problematic and the unproblematic (the unproblematic is usually understood to be the well-corroborated). But this demand is irrational and dogmatic. Often 'unproblematic background knowledge' is not even well-corroborated, and the clue to progress may lie in its overthrow. And even if it is well-corroborated, nothing prevents us from inferring from a negative result to its falsehood. If we perform an experiment, it depends on our methodological decision which theory we regard as the touchstone theory and which one as being under test; but this decision will determine in which deductive model we shall direct the modus tollens. Thus a 'potential falsifier', B, of T1, given some touchstone theory T2, may refute T1; but the same statement B, if regarded as a potential falsifier of T2, given T1 as touchstone theory, refutes T2.
In a mono-theoretical model we either regard the higher-level theory as an explanatory theory to be judged by the 'facts' delivered from outside: in case of a clash we reject the explanation; or we regard the higher-level theory as an interpretative theory to judge the 'facts' delivered from outside: in case of a clash we reject the 'facts' as 'monsters'. There is no other possibility. Of course, in a pluralistic model we have more than these two alternatives. Thus the Popperian mono-theoretical model is a poor model for the critic: several theories-more or less deductively organisedare soldered to each other in 'testing'. But then we face a new problem in method: at which theory do we choose to direct the modus tollens in case of a 'refutation' ?23 All that experiments can show is an inconsistency of the theories involved-explicitly, or 'implicitly' as a hidden lemma-in the interpretation and explanation of the experiment, an inconsistency between the theories which were used as touchstone theories and the theory which was tested. How should we decide which theory to replace in order to remove this inconsistency?24
The problem becomes still more difficult if we realise that the theories we criticise always contain, in addition, a 'ceterisparibus'. But what if T' (the touchstone theory-or, rather, interpretative theory) is false? Why not argue that from Tit follows that atomic weights must be whole numbers ? Then this wiUl be a 'hard fact' in virtue of T, and T' will be overthrown. Perhaps additional new purifying procedures must be invented and applied.
The problem is then not when we should stick to a 'theory' in the tace of 'known facts' and when the other way round. The problem is not what to do when 'theories' clash with 'facts'. Such a 'clash' is only suggested by the mono-theoretical deductive model. Whether a proposition is a 'fact' or a 'theory' depends on our methodological decision. 'Empirical basis' is a mono-theoretical notion, it is relative to some mono-theoretical deductive structure. In the pluralistic model the clash is between two high-level theories: an interpretative theory to provide the facts and an explanatory theory to explain them; and the interpretative theory may be on quite as high a level as the explanatory theory. The problem is not whether a refutation is real or not. The problem is how to repair an inconsistency between the 'explanatory theory' under test and the-explicit or hidden-'interpretative' theories; or, if you wish, the problem is which theory to consider as the interpretative one which provides the 'hard' facts and which the explanatory one which 'tentatively' explains them. Thus experiments do not overthrow theories, as Popper, has it, but only increase the problem-fever of the body of science. No theory forbids some state of affairs specificable in advance; it is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO. Rather, we propose a maze of theories, and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT.37
The problem is then shifted from the problem of replacing a theory refuted by 'facts' to the new problem of how to resolve inconsistencies between closely associated theories. Which of the mutually inconsistent theories should be eliminated? This problem can be solved in a novel way with the help of Popper2's ideas.
(c) Popper2 and growth.
Popperl's famous slogans are: 'make sincere attempts to refute your theories', 'we learn from our mistakes', 'a refutation is a victory'. The whole scientific effort is geared towards producing counterexamples, and as Kuhn correctly says, Popperian, progress consists of repeated overthrows of theories. The concentration on 'refutation' and the conflation of 'refutation' and rejection: these are Popperl's central tenets.
Popper2 concentrates on growth, not on refutation. His problem is how to appraise which is the best among competing possibly false theories. He discards the justiflcationist solution that a theory is better than its rival if it is proved, while its rival unproved: all theories are equally unproved (and, of course, equally unprovable). He discards the (neo-justificationist) probabilistic solution that a theory is better than its rival if it is more probable in the light of observational evidence: he shows that all theories are equally improbable. He discards the instrumentalist solution that a theory is better than its rival if it is 'simpler' than its rival from the point of view of intellectual comfort. Instead of all these he proposes 37Let me here answer a possible objection: 'Surely we do not need Nature to tell us that a set of theories is inconsistent. Inconsistency-unlike falsehood--can be ascertained without Nature's help.' But Nature's actual 'NO' in a mono-theoretical methodology takes the form of an asserted 'potential falsifier', that is a sentence which, in this way of speech, we claim Nature had uttered and which is the negation of our theory. Nature's actual 'INCONSIS-TENT' in a pluralistic methodology takes the form of a 'factual' statement couched in the light of one of the theories involved, which we claim Nature had uttered and which, if added to our proposed theories, yields an inconsistent system. Since all theories are born refuted39, bare 'refutations' can play no dramatic role in science. If new theories emerge in the midst of an ocean of counterexamples, slowly digesting-or even producing and digesting-their refutations, the injunction to 'make sincere attempts to refute your theories', falls completely flat. A corroborated falsifying hypothesis does not have sufficient power to enable a counterexample to eliminate a theory. If it had, we would eliminate all science instantly. A counterexample, in order to reject, to eliminate a theory, needs more powerful support than that which a lower-level falsifying hypothesis can provide: it needs the support of a theory with more corroborated content, with wider explanatory power. There must be no elimination without the acceptance of a better theory.40
Popperl's and Popper2's problem was when is an unrefuted theory better than a refuted rival one. The problem now shifts to the problem when is a theory better than its rival if both are known to be refuted. Now Popper2's thesis-inherited from Popperlthat theories are either corroborated or refuted is false. But for 38Popper,'s and Popper2's philosophy can be best described in terms of (tentative) prior and posterior 'acceptance' (acceptance, and acceptance2) and 'elimination' of theories. According to Popper1, we 'acceptl' any theory which is refutable ('prior acceptance') and 'accept2' it to the degree that it stands up to our 'sincere attempts' to refute it. We eliminate it on mere refutation (on the acceptance2 of a 'falsifying hypothesis'). According to Popper2, we accept1 a theory which has excess empirical content over its rival or predecessor; we accept2 it if some of this excess content is corroborated; we eliminate it on mere refutation. For a detailed discussion of 'acceptability1' and 'acceptability2' cp. my [1968] , pp. 375-90. 39 The truth of this remark will be obvious to the historian of science. As Kuhn aptly says: 'If any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times.' ([1962] Popper2's position this thesis is irrelevant since the two (prior and posterior) comparative appraisals of acceptance of Popper2 apply also to refuted theories. The first appraisal compares empirical contents which have nothing to do with truth or falsity; the second appraisal compares novel corroborated content: but we can make this comparison irrespective of their-old or new-refuted content.41 Indeed, we know that both the Cartesian and Newtonian theories were known to be refuted at the same time when the latter superseded the former: and we also know that both the Newtonian and Einsteinian theories were known to be refuted when the latter superseded the former.42) Let me now introduce a couple of new terms for Popper2's logic of discovery. Since Popper2 always appraises theories by comparing them the appraisal is rather of a series of theories than of an isolated theory. Now let us call a series of successive theories each of which is acceptable7-that is, each of which has higher content than its predecessor-a (theoretically) progressive problem-shift. Let us call a series of theories each of which is also acceptable2-that is, each of which produces 'facts' not entailed by its predecessor-an (empirically) progressive shift. But if theories are falsified all the time, they are problematic all the time, and therefore we may speak of progressive problem-shifts. If the problem-shift is not progressive. we call it degenerating. If we put forward a theory to resolve a contradiction between a previous theory and a counterexample in such a way that the new theory, instead of offering a-content-increasing-scientific explanation43, only offers a-content-decreasing-linguistic reinterpretation, the contradiction is resolved in a merely semantical, unscientific way. Popper2 forbids the use of such unscientific content-decreasing stratagems. But Popper2 can easily get rid of Popperl's untenable, falsificationist, elimination rule and replace it by a different one which is wedded naturally to his acceptance rules. According to this new rule, if we have two conflicting theories, one explanatory and one interpretative, and we do not know which is which-that is, we do not know which should prevail as the interpretative theory providing thefacts-we have to try to replace first one, then the other, then possibly both, and opt for that new set-up which represents the most progressive problem-shift, with the biggest increase in corroborated content.
Popper2 can also solve the problem of finding a 'guilty hidden lemma'.47 For, in the spirit of Popper2, we can admit that the premises form an indefinite-or even infinite-conjunction, "Thereare two differences. One is thatIimprovedPopper'sconceptionof an empirical problem-shift (that is, his original conception of 'acceptability,'; cp. my [1968] , pp. 388-90). The other is that, according to Popper, a progressive theory never adopts a content-decreasing stratagem to absorb a counterexample, it never says that 'all bodies are Newtonian except for seventeen anomalous ones'. But since such yet unexplained anomalies always abound I allow such anomalies; an explanation is a step forward (that is 'scientific') if it explains at least some previous anomalies which were not explained scientifically by its predecessor. As long as anomalies are regarded as genuine problems, it does not matter much whether we dramatise them as 'refutations' or de-dramatise them as 'exceptions': the difference then is only a linguistic one. Let us finally mention that the separation by Popper2 of the notions of (low-level) 'refutation' and growth, soldered together by Popper,, is so sharp, that according to Popper2 science can grow without any 'refutations' leading the way. It is perfectly possible that theories be put forward 'progressively' in such a rapid succession that the refutation of the n-th appears only as the corroboration of the n+ 1-th. According to Popper1, the growth of science is linear, in the sense that theories are followed by eliminating refutations, and these refutations in turn by new theories. What I have primarily in mind is not science as a whole, but rather particular research-programmes, such as the one known as 'Cartesian metaphysics'. Cartesian metaphysics, that is, the mechanistic theory of the universe-according to which the universe is a huge clockwork with push as the only cause of motionfunctions as a powerful heuristic principle: excluding, on the negative side, all scientific theories-like the 'essentialist' version of Newton's theory of action at a distance-which are inconsistent with it (negative heuristic) and implying, on the positive side, a 'metaphysical' research-programme to look behind all phenomena (and theories) for explanations based on clockwork mechanisms (positive heuristic).60 (a) Negative heuristic.
All scientific research-programmes may be characterised by their 'hard core'. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus tollens at this 'hard core': it bids us to articulate or even invent with great ingenuity touchstone theories, 'auxiliary hypotheses', which build up a protective belt around this core, and redirect the modus tollens on to these. It is this protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and readjusted, or even completely replaced in the defence of the thus hardened core. A research-programme is successful if in the process it leads to a progressive problemshift; unsuccessful if it leads to a degenerating problem-shift.
Let us take an example. Newton's gravitational theory was possibly the most successful research-programme ever. When it was first produced, it was submerged in an ocean of counterexamples, 'anomalies', and opposed by the observational theories supporting these anomalies. But Newtonians turned, with brilliant tenacity and ingenuity, one counter-instance after another into corroborating instances. In the process they themselves produced new counter-examples which they again resolved. They 'turned each new difficulty into a new victory of their programme.'6' I used to give in my lectures the following imaginary example of Newtonian growth. Let us take Newton's mechanics and the law of gravitation (the hard core C of the programme); and the initial conditions in some planetary system and several observational theories (the protective belt Bo). Let us imagine that a planet p slightly disobeys the theory N,, made up from C and B,. Would the Newtonian consider that this refutes C? No. He will suggest changing the hypotheses, say, about the initial conditions and will suggest that there must be a hitherto unknown, very small planet, p', perturbing the orbit of p. He would propose an auxiliary theory of p' describing its orbit, mass, etc. Then he will test the proposed orbit of p', replacing B, by B2. He would try to plan bigger telescopes to make this conjectural orbit of p' discernible, testable. But if it seems that the conjectured planet is not in the reach even of the biggest optical telescopes, he may try some quite new instrument (like a radiotelescope) in order to enable us to 'observe it', that is , to ask-however indirectly-Nature about it. The new observational theory may itself be poorly articulated, but for the time being they will not care. If the new instrument locates the planet where C & B2 predicted, the result will be hailed as a victory for the research-programme (arrived at by sacrificing B1) and, incidentally, also for the new observational theory.
If the planet is not found, would the Newtonian consider that this refutes C? No. Would he consider that this refutes his theory about the disturbing small planet? No. He will suggest, say, that a cloud of cosmic dust must hide the planet from us: B2 which recorded no such cloud, was in this respect false. He will calculate the location and properties of this cloud (thereby introducing B3) and send a satellite to test it. If the satellite's instruments (possibly with the help of yet another weakly-tested 'observational theory') record the existence of the conjectured cloud, the result will be hailed as a big victory for the research-programme (arrived at by modifying, or if you wish, sacrificing B2) and, incidentally, also for the new observational theory.
If the satellite records no such cloud, would the Newtonian consider that this refutes C? No. He might still stick to his imaginary small planet, to his imaginary cloud, and suggest, say, that the cloud is there, but the observational theory on which the satellite's experimental techniques were based, were false. B3 too will be modified and some B4 model that he derived his inverse square law for Kepler's ellipsis. But this model was forbidden by Newton's own third law of dynamics, therefore the model had to be replaced by one in which bothsun and planet revolved round theircommon centre of gravity. This change was not motivated by any observation (the data did not then suggest here an 'anomaly') but by a theoretical difficulty. Then he worked out the programme for more planets as if there were only heliocentric but no interplanetary forces. Then he worked out the case where the sun and planets were not masspoints but mass-balls. This change again did not need the observation of an anomaly; rather, infinite density was forbidden by an (inarticulated) touchstone theory, therefore planets had to be extended. This change had considerable mathematical difficulties and held up Newton's work-and delayed the publication of the Principia by more than a decade.65 Having solved this 'puzzle', he started work on spinning balls and their wobbles. Then he admitted interplanetary forces and started work on perturbations. At this point he started to look more anxiously at the facts. Many of them were beautifully explained (qualitatively) by this model, many were not. It was then that he started to work on bulging planets, rather than round planets, etc.
Newton despised people who, like Hooke, stumbled on a first naive model but did not have the tenacity and ability to develop it into a research-programme, and who thought that a first version, a mere aside, constituted already a 'discovery'. He held up publication until his programme had achieved a remarkable progressive shift.
But most, if not all, Newtonian 'puzzles', leading to a series of new variants superseding each other were forseeable at the time of Newton's first naive model and no doubt Newton and his colleagues did foresee them: Newton must have been fully aware ofthe blatant falsity of his first variants.66 Nothing shows the existence of a positive heuristic of a research-programme better than this fact: this is why one speaks of 'models' in research-programmes. 6I Bohr would have postponed the publication of his theory of the atom if not for Rutherford's encouragement to publish its first, unsophisticated and obviously false version.
Il For a detailed discussion of Newton's research-programme cp. my [1969] .
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
A 'model' is a set of initial conditions (possibly together with some of the observational theories) which one knows is bound to be replaced during the further development of the programme, and one even knows, more or less, exactly how. This shows once more how irrelevant refutations of any specific variant are in a researchprogramme: their existence is fully expected, the positive heuristic is there as the strategy both to predict (produce) and to digest them. (Not that suprises are excluded; indeed, they are bound to occur.
This may first lead to a need for a more creative development of the positive heuristic; and later may, with the help of a rival programme, overthrow the research-programme altogether.) One may formulate the 'positive heuristic' of a researchprogramme as a 'metaphysical' principle. For instance one may formulate Newton's programme like this: 'the planets are essentially gravitating spinning-tops of roughly spherical shape.' This idea was never rigidly maintained: the planets are not just gravitational, they have also electro-magnetic, etc., characteristics which even influence their motion. It is better therefore to separate the 'hard core' from the more flexible metaphysical principles expressing the positive heuristic.
Our considerations show that the positive heuristic forges ahead with almost complete disregard to the 'refutations': it may seem that it is the veriflcations67 rather than the refutations which provide the contact points with reality.68 Although one must point out that any verification of the n+ 1-th version of the programme is a refutation of the n-th version, we cannot deny that some defeats of the subsequent versions are always foreseen: it is the verifications which keep the programme going, recalcitrant instances notwithstanding.
We may appraise research-programmes, even after their 'elimination', for their heuristic power: how many new facts they pro-67 A 'verification' is a corroboration of excess content in the expanding programme.
68 Unfortunately I cannot here discuss this point in detail. I do it m a case study on Bohr's research-programme in my [1969] . Another classical example is provided by the story of kinetic gas theory. duced, how great was 'their capacity to explain their refutations in the course of their growth'.69
The dialectic of positive and negative heuristic can be seen very clearly in the case of Prout's research-programme. Prout, in a paper published anonymously in 1815, claimed that the atomic weights of all pure chemical elements are whole numbers. He knew very well that anomalies abounded: but he proposed that these are due to the fact that chemical substances as they ordinarily occurred were impure. The protagonists of Prout's theory therefore embarked on a research-programme to separate pure elements. : 'The author of the following essay submits it to the public with the greatest diffidence; for though he has taken the utmost pains to arrive at the truth, yet he has not that confidence in his abilities as an experimentalist as to induce him to dictate to others far superior to himself in chemical acquirements and fame. He trusts, however, that its importance will be seen, and that some one will undertake to examine it, and thus verify or refute its conclusions. If these should be proved erroneous, still new facts may be brought to light, or old ones better established, by the investigation; but if they should be verified, a new and interesting light will be thrown upon the whole science of chemistry. Popper, as we have seen, did not explain some important aspects of continuity in the growth of science. But did we not go in our 'anti-falsificationist' approach so far to the other extreme that now we are bound to say that even the celebrated"crucial experiments' have no force to overthrow a research-programme?
The answer is very easy. In the progress of science there is a proliferation of competing research-programmes. The first 'naive' models of competing programmes deal usually with different aspects of the domain (e.g. the first model of Newton's semicorpuscular optics described light-refraction, the first model of Huyghens' wave optics light interference). As the rival researchprogrammes expand, they gradually encroach on each other's territory and the n-th version of the first will be blatantly, dramatically inconsistent with the m-th version of the second. The first is defeated in this battle, the second wins, But the war is not over: any research-programme is allowed a few such defeats. All it needs for a comeback is to produce an n + l-th content-increasing version and a verification of some of its novel content.
If such a comeback, after sustained effort, is not forthcoming, the war is lost and the experiment proved, with hindsight, 'crucial'. But the resistance may last for a long time, for the defeated programme may hold out with ingenious content-increasing innovations unrewarded with empirical success. It is very difficult to defeat a research-programme supported by talented, imaginative If an auxiliary theory which performs the reinterpretation produces novel facts (that is, it is 'independently testable') the metaphysics should be regarded as good, scientific, empirical metaphysics, generating a progressive problem-shift. A progressive metaphysical theory produces a sustained progressive shift in its protective belt of auxiliary theories. If the reduction of the theory to the metaphysical framework does not produce new empirical content, let alone novel facts, then the reduction represents a degenerating problem-shift-it is a mere linguistic exercise. The Cartesian efforts to bolster up their metaphysics to interpret Newtonian gravitation in its terms, is an outstanding example for such merely linguistic reduction.m Thus we do not eliminate a metaphysical theory-as Wisdom suggests-if it clashes with a well-corroborated scientific theory. This would be a generalisation of naive falsificationism. We eliminate it if it produces a degenerating shift in the long run and there is a better, rival, metaphysics to replace it.84 The methodology of a research-programme with a 'metaphysical' core does not differ from the methodology of one with a 'refutable' core except for the logical level of the inconsistencies which are the driving force of the programme.
But the choice of logical form in articulating theories depends to a large extent on our methodological decision. For instance, we may formulate Cartesian metaphysics as 'all objects are clockworks'. A basic statement contradicting this would be: 'a is an object and it is not a clockwork'. The question is whether according to the 'experimental techniques', or rather, to the interpretative theories of the day, 'x is not a clockwork' can be 'established' or not. Thus the rational choice of the logical form of theories depends on the state of our knowledge; for instance, a metaphysical 'all-some' statement, of today may become, with the change in the level of observational theories a scientific 'all statement' tomorrow. I already argued that only series of theories and not theories should be demarcated into scientific and non83This phenomenon was described in a beautiful paper by Whewell ([1856]); but he could not explain it methodologically. Instead of recognising the victory of the progressive Newtonian programme over the degenerating Cartesian programme, he thought this was the victory of proven truth over falsity. For details cp. my [1969] : for a general discussion of the demarcation between progressive and degenerating reduction cp. Popper [1968b] ). 84 The best rational reconstruction of Newton's famous 'hypotheses non fingo' is probably; 'I reject degenerating problem-shifts which are devised to preserve some theory whether it be syntactically metaphysical or otherwise'. science is in an eternal mess. There is no particular rational cause for a 'crisis' which leads to the overthrow of a 'paradigm'. Kuhn's 'crisis' is a psychological concept; it is a contagious panic. But then scientific revolution is irrational, a matter for mob psychology.
The reduction of philosophy of science to psychology of science did not start with Kuhn. An earlier wave of 'psychologism' followed the breakdown of justificationism. For many, justificationism represented the only possible form of rationality: the end of justificationism meant the end of rationality: The collapse of the thesis that scientific theories are provable, that the progress of science is cumulative, made justificationists panic. If 'to discover is to prove', but nothing is provable, then there can be 85 Watkins [1968] , p. 281 88 Kuhn [1969] . no discoveries, only discovery-claims. Thus disappointedjustificationists--exjustificationists-thought that the elaboration of rational standards was a hopeless enterprise: all that one can do is to study-and imitate-the Scientific Mind, as it is exemplified in famous scientists. After the collapse of Newtonian physics, Popper elaborated new, non-justificationist critical standards. Now some of those who had already learned of the collapse of justificationist rationality now learned, mostly by hearsay, of Popperl's colourful falsificationist slogans. Finding them untenable, they identified the collapse of Popperl's rationality with the end of rationality itself. The elaboration of rational standards was again regarded as a hopeless enterprise; the best one can do is to study, they thought once again, the Scientific Mind. Critical philosophy was to be replaced by-as Polanyi called it-'postcritical' philosophy. But the Kuhnian research-programme contains a new feature: we have to study not the mind of the individual scientist but the mind of the Scientific Community. Individual psychology is now replaced by social psychology; imitation of the great scientist by submission to the collective wisdom of the community.
But Kuhn overlooked Popper2 and the research programme he initiated. Popper2 replaced the central problem of classical rationality, the old problem offoundations, with the new problem of growth, and started to elaborate objective and critical standards of growth. In this paper I have tried to develop this programme a step further. I think this small development is sufficient to escape Kuhn's strictures.87
The reconstruction of scientific progress as proliferation of rival research-programmes and progressive and degenerative problem-shifts gives a picture of the scientific enterprise which is in many ways different from the picture provided by its reconstruction as a succession of bold theories and their dramatic overthrows. Its main aspects were developed from Popper2's ideas and, in 87 Indeed, my concept of a 'research-programme' may be construed as an objective, 'third-world' reconstruction of Kuhn's concept of 'paradigm': thus the Kuhnian 'Gestalt-switch' can be performed without removing one's Popperian spectacles. 
